A desvinculação de receitas da união (DRU): sua constitucionalidade e a repercussão no custeio da previdência social

Abstract

The objective of this study was to analyze the controversial aspects of the Union's budget disbursement mechanism (DRU), its impact on Social Security funding, especially Social Security, and to present the grounds that foster the need for effective constitutional control of this instrument. For that, the conditions for the emergence of the DRU and its successive extensions were presented. The debate on its constitutionality was composed of decisions of the Federal Supreme Court that deal, even secondarily, on the subject. There are several questions that raise the unconstitutionality of the DRU, some controversial points were presented in order to demonstrate the legal relevance of the issue, and the need to address the issue by the Major Court, highlighting the Arbitration for Non-compliance with Fundamental Precept No. 415 (ADPF 415), because it is the only constitutional control action whose core questioning is the unconstitutionality of DRU, and its effects. The problem faced in the research is that the transfer of funds from the Social Security Budget to the Fiscal Budget, through the DRU, is legally questionable as to its constitutionality and the continuity of this mechanism has generated losses to the system of financing the Pension Plan, which it is in a budget situation with a deficit curve, and it does not have at its disposal resources derived from surpluses of previous years. The work was done using specialized doctrine, scientific articles, jurisprudence, related legislation, and analysis of tables. As a result, it can be verified that the losses to Social Security financing are irreparable from the point of view of the impossibility of returning untied resources, but a better understanding of the subject should provide greater social awareness about the real needs of adequacy for the maintenance of the social security costing.