O julgamento do Habeas Corpus 126.192/SP e sua inconstitucionalidade frente ao princípio da presunção de inocência

Abstract

Until February 2016, the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court accepted that the execution of a penalty could only happen with a penal conviction sentence transited in judged, at which time the sentence is no longer subject to appeal and can no longer be discussed. In this way, the arrest was admitted when it was based on a final judgment sentence or on exceptional cases of pre-trial detention. However in the judgment of HC 126.192, the Supreme Court came to understand that it is possible to execute the sentence in advance on the basis of a decision Second degree conviction. The objective of this job is to develop an analysis of the constitutionality of the new understanding of the Supreme Court, in other words, the possibility of early execution of the sentence in the face of the principle of presumption of innocence, a norm expressed in the Federal Constitution, which establishes that no one will be considered guilty until the condemnation sentence transited in judged. To this end, the content of this principle will be examined, as also the historic of the STF jurisprudence regarding the possibility of early execution of the sentence. The methodology used in the present work is of the bibliographical and documentary type.